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Threema seems to be the most secure messaging app on the market, but after reading below should phones or digital communication be used at all? Look at the best three secure messaging apps. Threema, Telegram, Signal. (links).I know which I use. However always choose your own. Don't be swayed to use any messaging app recommended to you. Research.

EncroChat: Cracked or Plant?

 

In 2020, French authorities successfully infiltrated the EncroChat encrypted phone network, which was widely used by criminal organizations for secure communication.

 

Here's how they did it: EncroChat was one of the largest providers of encrypted communication services, with an estimated 60,000 users across Europe. The service was popular among criminal networks because it offered highly secure messaging, with features like the removal of microphones, cameras, and GPS from devices to prevent tracking and interception.

EncroChat used end-to-end encryption to secure its users' communications. This encryption method ensures that only the communicating users can read the messages, making it extremely difficult for anyone else, including the service provider, to intercept and decipher the content.

Understanding End-to-End Encryption: End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is a method of data transmission that ensures only the communicating users can read the messages. It provides a high level of security by encrypting the data at the sender's device and only decrypting it at the recipient's device.

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Here's a deeper look at how it works: When you send a message, your device encrypts it before it leaves your device. This encryption uses a unique key that only the intended recipient has the decryption key for. The encrypted message is transmitted over the internet. While in transit, it remains encrypted and unreadable to anyone who might intercept it, including service providers and potential hackers. When the encrypted message reaches the recipient's device, it is decrypted using the unique key stored on that device. Only the recipient's device can decrypt the message, making the data readable again.

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Each user has a pair of cryptographic keys – a public key (known to everyone) and a private key (kept secret). The sender encrypts the message using the recipient's public key, and the recipient decrypts it using their private key.

Even if someone intercepts the message during transmission, they cannot read it without the private key. This ensures the privacy and security of the communication.

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End-to-end encryption is widely used in messaging apps (like WhatsApp, Signal), email services, and other secure communication platforms. This openly indicates that the claim these applications are safe and keep your data protected is only true to a degree. IF, EncroChat was hacked by French Authorities then no End-to-End Encryption is safe. We at Underbelly know the level of security E2EE provides and how difficult it is to burgle.

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E2EE should ensure that only the intended recipient can read the messages, protecting against eavesdropping and unauthorized access. Protect data integrity during transmission, ensuring it cannot be tampered with or altered by even to top Pen Testers. However, users must securely manage their encryption keys. Losing a private key means losing access to the encrypted data.

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E2EE is so complex that simply implementing end-to-end encryption requires robust technical infrastructure and expertise.

End-to-end encryption developers claim it provides a robust method for securing communications, ensuring that data remains private and secure from the moment it leaves the sender's device until it is decrypted by the recipient. While it presents some challenges, its benefits in protecting privacy and data integrity make it a crucial tool in modern digital communications.

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End-to-end encryption (E2EE) is designed to be highly secure, making it extremely difficult to hack. Here are some key points to consider - E2EE uses robust encryption algorithms like AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) and RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), which are widely regarded as the most secure and have withstood extensive cryptographic analysis and penetration testing. A communication session uses unique encryption keys, which are only known to the sender and recipient. This means even if one session is compromised, other sessions remain secure. Successfully breaking E2EE encryption without access to the private keys is computationally infeasible with current technology. It would require an enormous amount of time and resources, making it impractical for most attackers.

security of E2EE also depends on the security of the devices at both ends of the communication. If a device is compromised (e.g., through malware), the encryption can be bypassed.

While no system is entirely hack-proof, end-to-end encryption provides a very high level of security, making it one of the best methods available for protecting sensitive communications. However, it's essential to ensure proper implementation and maintain good security practices on the devices involved.

 

The Investigation

​Encrochat was not the first investigation of this kind. The FBI pulled off one of the boldest tech stings in recent history with a covert operation called Trojan Shield, centered around a fake encrypted phone company named Anom:

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Operation Trojan Shield ran from October 2018 to June 2021:

 

• October 2018: The first ANOM devices were distributed to criminal networks for beta testing.

• Mid-2019 to 2021: The platform gained traction globally, with thousands of devices in use.

• 8 June 2021: Law enforcement agencies executed coordinated raids worldwide, marking the public reveal and conclusion of the operation.

It was a multi-year sting that quietly infiltrated criminal communications before culminating in one of the largest law enforcement actions ever.

 

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Here's how it worked:

• The Setup: After shutting down other encrypted phone services used by criminals (like Phantom Secure), the FBI partnered with a confidential source to develop Anom—a phone that looked like a secure device but secretly copied every message sent through it.

• The Tech: These phones were modified versions of Google Pixel and Samsung devices, running a custom OS called Arcane OS. They had hidden back doors that allowed law enforcement to monitor communications in real time.

• The Distribution: The FBI used trusted criminal distributors to spread the phones, making them seem like the next big thing in secure communication. Access was invite-only, which added to their allure.

• The Trap: Criminals used Anom to coordinate drug deals, money laundering, and other illicit activities—thinking they were safe. In reality, the FBI was reading everything. Over 27 million messages were intercepted from 11,800 devices across 90+ countries, leading to 800+ arrests.

• The operation was so successful it’s been called the biggest sting in Australian history, and it’s now the subject of books and documentaries. It also sparked debates about privacy, surveillance ethics, and the future of law enforcement tech.

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Then there was the Sky ECC global bust. This was one of the most dramatic take-downs of an encrypted communication network used by organized crime. 

Here's how it unfolded:

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What Was Sky ECC?

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A subscription-based encrypted messaging service developed by Sky Global, founded in Vancouver in 2008.Marketed as “unhackable,” it used  elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) and featured self-destructing messages, kill switches, and disabled GPS/microphones.

Devices were modified smartphones (BlackBerry, Nokia, Apple, Android) sold for criminal use.

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The Crackdown:

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Over 100 convictions in Belgium’s largest drug trial by October 2024, with sentences up to 17 years and millions in assets seized

January 2025: Spanish and Dutch authorities arrested four top distributors who managed 25% of Sky ECC’s subscriptions, earning over €13.5 million.

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March 2021: Europol and law enforcement agencies from Belgium, the Netherlands, and France cracked Sky ECC’s encryption and began monitoring 70,000 users in real time.

Raids: On 9 March 2021, Belgian police conducted 200 raids, arrested 48 people, and seized €1.2 million and 17 tonnes of cocaine.

The network was so trusted that criminals openly shared execution orders, torture images, and insider financial data.

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Aftermath & Arrest:

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Over 100 convictions in Belgium’s largest drug trial by October 2024, with sentences up to 17 years and millions in assets seized.

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January 2025: Spanish and Dutch authorities arrested four top distributors who managed 25% of Sky ECC’s subscriptions, earning over €13.5 million.

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​Seizures included cryptocurrency, luxury items, vehicles, and mobile devices.

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Legal Fallout:

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Sky Global’s CEO, Jean-François Eap, was indicted by the U.S. DOJ for RICO violations, accused of knowingly aiding criminal enterprises.

The company denied wrongdoing, claiming it was targeted for defending privacy rights.

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This operation exposed the dark side of encrypted tech and sparked global debates on privacy vs. surveillance. Want to explore how criminals adapted after Sky ECC fell—or what law enforcement learned from it?

 

 

Then came the EncroChat sting—part of Operation Venetic—was undeniably one of the most successful law enforcement operations against organized crime in Europe. But with its scale and secrecy came a swirl of conspiracy theories and legal challenges. Let’s unpack what’s real and what’s speculative.

Common Conspiracies & Claims

1. Illegal Hacking Allegations

 

• Claim: French authorities hacked EncroChat servers unlawfully.

• The French government has maintained that the operation was legal under its jurisdiction. UK courts have upheld the admissibility of the evidence, though some defense lawyers argue the surveillance violated privacy rights

• EncroChat Was a Government Honeytrap

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• Claim: EncroChat was secretly created or co-opted by law enforcement.

• There’s no credible evidence that EncroChat was a government front. It was a Dutch-based company offering encrypted phones, and its downfall came from a technical tool installed by French investigators.

• Evidence Was Fabricated.

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• Claim: Messages were altered or wrongly linked to suspects.

• Truth: Courts have seen cases where suspects were identified through metadata, selfies, and even GPS overlaps with personal phones. While attribution challenges exist, convictions have held up under scrutiny.

• EncroChat Users Were Targeted Without Due Process

• Claim: Arrests were made without proper warrants or legal basis.

• Law enforcement agencies across Europe coordinated through Europol and followed national procedures. In the UK, over 3,000 arrests and 1,000 convictions have been secured, with courts consistently ruling the evidence admissible.

• 5. EncroChat Wasn't That Effective

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• Claim: Despite the bust, drug trade and crime remain unaffected.

• Truth: While the sting disrupted major networks, reports suggest Europe’s drug trade rebounded quickly. New players filled the void, and encrypted platforms evolve.

• Legal Fallout & Ongoing Debate

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• Defense lawyers continue to challenge the legality of the hack, especially around privacy rights and cross-border surveillance.

• Some cases have raised concerns about fair trial rights, especially when defendants couldn’t access full technical details of the hack.

• So yes—there are real legal debates, but most of the wilder conspiracies haven’t held up. Want to explore how criminals adapted after EncroChat or what tech replaced it?

• Operation Venetic officers first claimed that a device was attached to the EncroChat server allowing Europol and the French authorities access to the server for 10 weeks

The French Gendarmerie began investigating EncroChat in 2017 after discovering that the phones were frequently found in operations against organized crime groups. They suspected that the company was operating from servers in France.

To infiltrate EncroChat, French authorities managed to bypass EncroChat’s encryption by secretly installing a technical tool onto the platform’s servers. This tool allowed them to intercept and decrypt messages in real time before they could be fully encrypted and transmitted between users.

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The hack had a significant impact on organized crime across Europe. In the UK alone, it led to the arrest of approximately 746 suspected high-ranking criminals involved in activities such as murder, gun smuggling, and drug trafficking. Authorities seized large amounts of cash and drugs as a result of the operation.

The successful infiltration of EncroChat by French authorities demonstrated the vulnerabilities even in highly secure communication networks. It also highlighted the importance of international cooperation in tackling organized crime and the effectiveness of advanced technical measures in law enforcement operations.

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French authorities had access to EncroChat from April 1, 2020, when they first installed the interception tool, until June 13, 2020, when EncroChat announced it was shutting down due to the police operation. This means they had access for about two and a half months.

French authorities managed to infiltrate EncroChat by installing a technical tool on the company's servers in France. This operation, authorized by a judge in Lille at the end of January 2020, allowed them to gain access to millions of encrypted messages sent by users.

The authorities collaborated with the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Dutch police to leverage intelligence and technical expertise for this infiltration. This enabled them to monitor and investigate over 100 million messages in real-time, leading to numerous arrests and seizures across Europe.

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It was a significant and complex operation that showcased the lengths law enforcement agencies will go to in order to combat organized crime.

The device installed by French authorities on EncroChat's servers allowed them to intercept and read messages in real-time without necessarily needing to crack the end-to-end encryption directly. Instead of breaking the encryption, they were able to access the messages before they were encrypted or after they were decrypted on the users' devices. This method enabled them to monitor communications without alerting the users or compromising the encryption keys themselves.

 

The Second explanation the hacking operation conducted by French authorities involved accessing messages on users' devices before they were encrypted or after they were decrypted. They achieved this by deploying malware onto the EncroChat devices themselves. This malware allowed them to capture the plain text of the messages directly from the users' devices.

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Here's how they now claimed it worked: Malware Deployment:  French authorities deployed remote malware onto EncroChat devices, allowing them to covertly intercept messages before they were encrypted. This malware worked behind the scenes, secretly collecting real-time conversations, user data, and even login credentials.
The operation was incredibly sophisticated:French authorities managed to install malware on the EncroChat devices remotely. This malware was designed to operate covertly on the users' phones.

The malware intercepted messages at the endpoints—either before they were encrypted for sending or after they were decrypted upon receipt. This way, the authorities could read the messages in plain text without needing to break the encryption.

The hacking operation conducted by French authorities involved deploying malware that targeted EncroChat devices, rather than attacking the servers themselves directly. Here's a breakdown of how it worked: 

The French authorities developed and deployed malware specifically designed to be installed on EncroChat devices. This malware was covertly installed on the devices of EncroChat users.

Once installed, the malware allowed the authorities to capture plain text messages, "either" before they were encrypted for sending or after they were decrypted upon receipt. This effectively bypassed the end-to-end encryption without needing to break the encryption itself.

The malware was able to infiltrate a large number of devices across the EncroChat network, enabling the authorities to monitor millions of messages in real-time.

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While the servers facilitated the deployment of the malware by hosting updates and other services, the primary attack vector was the users' devices. The servers played a supporting role in distributing the malware to the devices.

This strategy allowed law enforcement to gather valuable intelligence and disrupt criminal activities coordinated through the EncroChat network. This method allowed law enforcement to bypass the encryption process entirely and access the communications directly from the users' devices.

Now they claim: The term "device" in this context can be a bit misleading. The French authorities did not necessarily attach a physical piece of hardware to the EncroChat servers. Instead, they deployed a software-based tool or malware onto the servers.

Here's a more precise breakdown: The "device" refers to a software tool or malware that was installed on the EncroChat servers and subsequently distributed to users' devices. This tool allowed authorities to intercept communications by exploiting the servers and the devices connected to them.

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This malware was deployed remotely and did not require physical access to the servers. It was designed to operate covertly on the users' phones, allowing authorities to capture messages in plain text before encryption or after decryption.

So, while no physical hardware was attached to the EncroChat servers, the software tool/malware effectively achieved the same goal of intercepting communications.

Why change tech terms. Any IT tech will tell you hardware and software are two different. Hardware is an actual device; software runs the device. Hardware is useless without software, drivers etc. Software is dangerous on its own as it can be installed on hardware after being built or manipulated to serve a purpose. But software is more easily traceable than a “Device” attached and hidden in the server?

 

Operation Venetic was a major international law enforcement operation targeting the encrypted communication platform EncroChat, which was widely used by organized crime groups. Here's a detailed overview:

EncroChat was a Europe-based company that provided modified smartphones with encrypted messaging services. It became popular among criminal organizations for coordinating illegal activities.

 

In early 2020, French and Dutch authorities, with support from Europol and Eurojust, launched Operation Venetic to infiltrate EncroChat. They installed a technical tool on EncroChat's servers, allowing them to intercept and monitor communications in real-time.

Authorities collected vast amounts of data, including millions of messages and hundreds of thousands of images. This data was analysed to identify and locate offenders.

The operation led to over 6,500 arrests and the seizure of nearly €900 million in cash, along with significant quantities of drugs, firearms, and other illegal items. It also prevented numerous threats to life by mitigating over 200 planned kidnappings and executions.

On June 13, 2020, EncroChat realized their platform had been compromised and urged users to discard their devices. The company announced it would cease operations due to the police operation.

Operation Venetic is considered one of the largest and most significant law enforcement operations against organized crime in Europe. It demonstrated the effectiveness of international cooperation in tackling encrypted criminal communication networks.

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EncroChat was a Dutch-based company that specialized in selling encrypted mobile phones designed for secure communication. These devices were modified Android smartphones with features like GPS, microphones, and cameras removed, and they came pre-installed with encrypted messaging applications.

EncroChat marketed itself as a legitimate provider of secure communication, boasting 60,000 users worldwide, including 10,000 in the UK. However, law enforcement agencies later discovered that the platform was widely used by organized crime groups for illicit activities.

Yes, three Dutch men were arrested in June 2022 for allegedly making €56 million by selling EncroChat encrypted phones to criminals. The suspects—Frans S. (64), Peter H. (43), and Hassan K. (48)—were accused of money laundering and participating in a criminal organization.
Authorities believe they were key figures in distributing EncroChat devices in the Netherlands, which was the largest market for these phones. Their trial is still ongoing, with the next hearing scheduled in a few months.

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Peter H., Hassan K., and Frans S. are three Dutch men accused of making €56 million by selling EncroChat encrypted phones to criminals. They were arrested in June 2022 and charged with money laundering and participating in a criminal organization.
Authorities believe they played a key role in distributing EncroChat devices in the Netherlands, which was the largest market for these phones. Their trial is ongoing, with the next hearing scheduled in a few months.
Interestingly, their lawyers argue that they were simply selling phones and did not specifically target criminals as customers. They claim that journalists, athletes, and employees of a listed company in the United States also used EncroChat devices.

These three men, whom have yet to bet to trial. There is not much about them to research. Only they sold the devices. What we should be considering is how 3 men, manufactured and sold so many Encrochat phones world wide?

Someone designed the phones, had all cameras and other traceable hardware/software removed. Then rebranded as Encrochat Encrypted phones and sold only on the black market to criminal gangs. Now if we look at Israel and the Hezbollah and Hamas pagers sting. One of the most brazen attacks through electronic devices.We have to now keep and eye on the trials of these three men. If we done they will just disappear under the radar. In reality these three alleged men are responsible for the whole Encrochat enterprise and are responsible for many high level criminals being arrested and charged with some real serious crime. They three would be dragged as witnesses to my trial if I was charged with Encrochat encrypted connections. I refuse to believe these phones were manufactured for any other reason than to entrap many involved in organized crime. Just like the Israeli pagers. Manufactured by security services to serve a purpose. They know, us as humans usually don't look into reasons why criminals are arrested me. But this intrigued me. Have a look at the Hezbollah pager, walkie talkie and electric car explosions.

How come no innocent member' of the public were injured after purchasing one of these pagers?

How come there is no research on any ordinary private person buying an Encrochat phone for their own private privacy purposes?

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PAGER, WALKIE TALKIE AND ELECTRIC CAR BLASTS  AGAINST HEZBOLLAH AND  HAMAS

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As you can read. The pager attack was very sophisticated. As was Encrochat. I know an Encrochat handset could not be bought on the open market. They were touted by other criminals on other encrypted applications, like telegram, whats app etc. Until  the backdoor key to Whats app was provided to law enforcement by Meta track and trace criminal behavior on their platform.

Is it beyond belief that Euro-pol, Eurojust or Interpol, NCA etc had the Encrochat system made and sat back and watched all the top criminals in Europe put themselves away. Those  devices were never cracked. The encryption was untraceable. Placed a device on the Enrochat Server? why not just take it with all details on it. download it. They claimed to have physical access. Then it was malware sent or planted by another handset user. Malware sent to the Encrochat server? Why not arrest who owned the encrypted server?

You have arrested the sellers> why not the manufacturers.

Then there's the encrypted app Telegram, why haven't you used similar techniques on breaking that encryption? Because you cant. You have had to arrest the CEO because you cannot crack that's encryption and law enforcement authorities in France , Holland, UK all have access to that server? Send the same malware, attach the same device used in Encrochat?

Telegram has similar end to end encryption to the Encrochat devices.

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Law enforcement agencies have struggled to crack Telegram’s encryption because:

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• This makes it extremely difficult for law enforcement to intercept or decrypt communications.Telegram uses end-to-end encryption for its Secret Chats, meaning only the sender and recipient can read the messages—not even Telegram itself. 

• However, Telegram’s regular chats are not end-to-end encrypted. Instead, they use server-client encryption, meaning Telegram stores messages on its servers, While this still provides security, it’s not as private as Secret Chats.

• That said, authorities can still track metadata, such as who is communicating with whom, and they can access Telegram messages if they gain access to a suspect’s device.

 

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Law enforcement initially struggled to crack EncroChat encrypted phones because they were designed with high-level security features to prevent interception. These devices had:

• End-to-end encryption that ensured messages were only readable by the sender and recipient.

• ​Self-destruct mechanisms, allowing users to remotely wipe their phones or delete messages with a PIN.

• ​Dual operating systems, with one appearing as a normal Android interface and the other hidden for encrypted communication.

• Modified hardware, including the removal of cameras, microphones, and GPS to prevent tracking

 

Hence why: Telegram's founder and CEO, Pavel Durov, was arrested in August 2024 in France. The charges included complicity in crimes such as child exploitation and drug trafficking, which allegedly occurred on the platform. French authorities accused Durov of refusing to cooperate with law enforcement by not providing encryption keys or user data.
Durov was released after paying a €5 million bail, but he was placed under judicial supervision and banned from leaving France. Telegram has maintained that it complies with EU laws and argued that the platform itself cannot be held responsible for misuse by its users.
This case sparked debates about privacy, free speech, and the accountability of tech companies.

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For your research:

The term "Venetic" has multiple meanings depending on the context:

1. Historical Language: Venetic refers to an extinct Indo-European language spoken by the Veneti people in ancient northeastern Italy and parts of modern Slovenia. It was used between the 6th and 1st centuries BCE and is known from inscriptions written in the Venetic alphabet.

2. Operation Venetic: In modern law enforcement, "Venetic" is associated with Operation Venetic, the UK's largest-ever crackdown on organized crime. This operation involved infiltrating encrypted communication platforms like EncroChat, leading to 746 arrests, the seizure of £54 million in criminal cash, and dismantling numerous criminal networks.

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In our opinion, something extremely fishy going on with Encrochat and the surrounding investigation..

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The Security Risks of Mobile Phones

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Mobile phones are an essential part of our everyday lives. They are not just for making phone calls anymore. We use them to access the internet, send text messages, take pictures and videos, and manage many aspects of our lives. However, this convenience comes with significant security risks that you should be aware of.

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Privacy and Security Weaknesses

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Mobile phones were not designed with strong privacy and security in mind. This means they do not do a good job of protecting your communications. Hackers can intercept your calls, texts, and online activities because many apps do not use strong enough encryption. Even apps that seem secure can have weaknesses that hackers can exploit.

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Location Tracking and Surveillance

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Another big risk with mobile phones is location tracking. Every smartphone has GPS capabilities that can track your movements in real-time. While this is useful for navigation and certain apps, it also means that unauthorized parties can access your location data, which can be a serious privacy threat.

One of the most significant privacy threats from mobile phones is the way they constantly broadcast your location. This can happen in several ways, but here are some of the primary methods

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2. Mobile Signal Tracking 

 

Cell Site Simulator  A government or another technically sophisticated organization can  also collect location data directly, such as with a cell site simulator  (a portable fake cell phone tower that pretends to be a real one, in  order to “catch” particular users' mobile phones and detect their  physical presence and/or spy on their communications, also sometimes  called an IMSI Catcher or Stingray). IMSI refers to the International  Mobile Subscriber Identity number that identifies a particular  subscriber's SIM card, though an IMSI catcher may target a device using other properties of the device as well. The IMSI catcher needs to be taken to a particular location in order  to find or monitor devices at that location. Currently there is no  reliable defense against all IMSI catchers. (Some apps claim to detect  their presence, but this detection is imperfect.) On devices that permit  it, it could be helpful to disable 2G support (so that the device can  connect only to 3G and 4G networks) and to disable roaming if you don't  expect to be traveling outside of your home carrier's service area.  These measures can protect against certain kinds of IMSI catchers.  

 

Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Tracking

 

 Modern smartphones have other radio transmitters in addition to the  mobile network interface. They usually also have Wi-Fi and Bluetooth  support. These signals are transmitted with less power than a mobile  signal and can normally be received only within a short range (such as  within the same room or the same building), although sometimes using a  sophisticated antenna allows these signals to be detected from  unexpectedly long distances; in a 2007 demonstration, an expert in  Venezuela received a Wi-Fi signal at a distance of 382 km or 237 mi,  under rural conditions with little radio interference. Both of these  kinds of wireless signals include a unique serial number for the device,  called a MAC address, which can be seen by anybody who can receive the  signal. The device manufacturer chooses this address at the time the  device is created and it cannot be changed using the software that comes  with current smartphones. Unfortunately, the MAC address can be observed in wireless signals  even if a device is not actively connected to a particular wireless  network, or even if it is not actively transmitting data. Whenever Wi-Fi  is turned on on a typical smartphone, the smartphone will transmit  occasional signals that include the MAC address and thus let others  nearby recognize that that particular device is present. This has been  used for commercial tracking applications, for example to let  shopkeepers determine statistics about how often particular customers  visit and how long they spend in the shop. As of 2014, smartphone  manufacturers have started to recognize that this kind of tracking is  problematic, but it may not be fixed in every device for years—if ever. In comparison to GSM monitoring, these forms of tracking are not  necessarily as useful for government surveillance. This is because they  work best at short distances and require prior knowledge or observation  to determine what MAC address is built into a particular person's  device. However, these forms of tracking can be a highly accurate way to  tell when a person enters and leaves a building. Turning off Wi-Fi and  Bluetooth on a smartphone can prevent this type of tracking, although  this can be inconvenient for users who want to use these technologies  frequently. Wi-Fi network operators can also see the MAC address of every device  that joins their network, which means that they can recognize particular  devices over time, and tell whether you are the same person who joined  the network in the past (even if you don't type your name or e-mail  address anywhere or sign in to any services). On a few devices, it is physically possible to change the MAC address  so that other people can't recognize your Wi-Fi device as easily over  time; on these devices, with the right software and configuration, it  would be possible to choose a new and different MAC address every day,  for example. On smartphones, this commonly requires special software  such as a MAC address-changing app. Currently, this option is not  available for the majority of smartphone models.  

 

Location

 

Information Leaks From Apps and Web Browsing  Modern smartphones provide ways for the phone to determine its own  location, often using GPS and sometimes using other services provided by  location companies (which usually ask the company to guess the phone's  location based on a list of cell phone towers and/or Wi-Fi networks that  the phone can see from where it is). Apps can ask the phone for this  location information and use it to provide services that are based on  location, such as maps that show you your position on the map.

 

Some of these apps will then transmit your location over the network  to a service provider, which, in turn, provides a way for other people  to track you. (The app developers might not have been motivated by the  desire to track users, but they might still end up with the ability to  do that, and they might end up revealing location information about  their users to governments or hackers.) Some smartphones will give you  some kind of control over whether apps can find out your physical  location; a good privacy practice is to try to restrict which apps can  see this information, and at a minimum to make sure that your location  is only shared with apps that you trust and that have a good reason to  know where you are. In each case, location tracking is not only about finding where  someone is right now, like in an exciting movie chase scene where agents  are pursuing someone through the streets. It can also be about  answering questions about people's historical activities and also about  their beliefs, participation in events, and personal relationships. For  example, location tracking could be used to try to find out whether  certain people are in a romantic relationship, to find out who attended a  particular meeting or who was at a particular protest, or to try and  identify a journalist's confidential source. The Washington Post reported in December 2013 on NSA  location-tracking tools that collect massive amounts of information “on  the whereabouts of cellphones around the world,” mainly by tapping phone  companies' infrastructure to observe which towers particular phones  connect to when.

 

A tool called CO-TRAVELER uses this data to find  relationships between different people's movements (to figure out which  people's devices seem to be traveling together, as well as whether one  person appears to be following another).  Turning Phones off   There's a widespread concern that phones can be used to monitor  people even when not actively being used to make a call. As a result,  people having a sensitive conversation are sometimes told to turn their  phones off entirely, or even to remove the batteries from their phones. The recommendation to remove the battery seems to be focused mainly on the existence of malware  that makes the phone appear to turn off upon request (finally showing  only a blank screen), while really remaining powered on and able to  monitor conversations or invisibly place or receive a call. Thus, users  could be tricked into thinking they had successfully turned off their  phones when they actually hadn't. Such malware does exist, at least for  some devices, though we have little information about how well it works  or how widely it has been used. Turning phones off has its own potential disadvantage: if many people  at one location all do it at the same time, it's a sign to the mobile  carriers that they all thought something merited turning their phones  off. (That “something” might be the start of a film in a movie theater,  or the departure of a plane at an airport, but it might also be a  sensitive meeting or conversation.) An alternative that might give less  information away is to leave everybody's phone in another room where the  phones' microphones wouldn't be able to overhear the conversations.  

 

Burner Phones

 

  Phones that are used temporarily and then discarded are often  referred to as burner phones or burners. People who are trying to avoid  government surveillance sometimes try to change phones (and phone  numbers) frequently to make it more difficult to recognize their  communications. They will need to use prepaid phones (not associated  with a personal credit card or bank account) and ensure that the phones  and SIM cards were not registered with their identity; in some countries  these steps are straightforward, while in others there may be legal or  practical obstacles to obtaining anonymous mobile phone service. There are a number of limitations to this technique. First, merely swapping SIM cards or moving a SIM card  from one device to another offers minimal protection, because the  mobile network observes both the SIM card and device together. In other  words, the network operator knows the history of which SIM cards have  been used in which devices, and can track either individually or both  together. Second, governments have been developing mobile location  analysis techniques where location tracking can be used to generate  leads or hypotheses about whether multiple devices actually belong to  the same person. There are many ways this can be done. For example, an  analyst could check whether two devices tended to move together, or  whether, even if they were in use at different times, they tended to be  carried in the same physical locations.

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A further problem for the successful anonymous use of telephone  services is that people's calling patterns tend to be extremely  distinctive. For example, you might habitually call your family members  and your work colleagues. Even though each of these people receive calls  from a wide range of people, you're likely the only person in the world  who commonly calls both of them from the same number. So even if you  suddenly changed your number, if you then resumed the same patterns in  the calls you made or received, it would be straightforward to determine  which new number was yours. Remember that this inference isn't made  based only on the fact that you called one particular number, but rather  on the uniqueness of the combination of all the numbers that you  called. (Indeed, The Intercept reported  that a secret U.S. government system called PROTON does exactly this,  using phone records to recognize people who placed phone calls in a  “similar manner to a specific target” from new phone numbers.) An  additional example can be found in the Hemisphere FOIA document.  

The document describes the Hemisphere database (a massive database of  historical call records) and how the people who run it have a feature  that can link burner phones by following the similarity of their call  patterns. The document refers to burner phones as "dropped phones"  because their user will "drop" one and start using another one—but the  database analytics algorithms can draw the connection between one phone  and another when this happens, so long as both were used to make or  receive calls to similar sets of phone numbers. Together, these facts mean that effective use of burner phones to  hide from government surveillance requires, at a minimum: not reusing  either SIM cards or devices; not carrying different devices together;  not creating a physical association between the places where different  devices are used; and not calling or being called by the same people  when using different devices. (This isn't necessarily a complete list;  for example, we haven't considered the risk  of physical surveillance of the place where the phone was sold, or the  places where it's used, or the possibility of software to recognize a  particular person's voice as an automated method for determining who is  speaking through a particular phone.)  

 

The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry shortcomings are a danger to survivors

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Unveiling the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry: A Barbaric Treatment of Victims.

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Underbelly True Crime

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The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, established in 2015, was intended to provide justice to survivors of historical abuse in various Scottish institutions. However, its treatment of victims throughout the process has been nothing short of shocking, endangering the pursuit of truth and justice. This scathing assessment aims to expose the failures and shortcomings of the inquiry, highlighting the continued mistreatment of survivors and the unjust practices that have marred its reputation.

 

1. Insufficient Support for Victims:

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The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has demonstrated a severe lack of empathy and consideration for the well being of survivors. Numerous victims have spoken out about the insufficient support provided, forcing them to relive their traumatic experiences without adequate emotional assistance or counseling. This neglect not only disregards their mental health but also undermines their ability to effectively present their experiences, damaging the prospects of a fair investigation.

 

2. Delayed Justice and Evasive

Tactics:

 

The inquiry's proceedings have been plagued by excessive delays, bureaucratic red tape, and evasive tactics, showcasing a disregard for survivors seeking justice. Time and time again, victims have been left waiting for their voice to be heard, only to be met with avoidable obstacles that hinder the progress of the inquiry. Such delays not only prolong the suffering of survivors but also allow perpetrators to escape accountability.

 

3. Limited Scope and Incomplete Investigation:

 

The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has faced criticism for its narrow focus, limiting the investigation to specific institutions and excluding others. By failing to broaden its scope and include all relevant organizations, the inquiry inadvertently perpetuates an incomplete understanding of the systemic failings that enabled child abuse to occur. This selective methodology risks shielding certain perpetrators, preventing a comprehensive and impartial examination of the issue.

 

4. Lack of Transparency and Public Confidence:

 

Transparency is crucial for an inquiry of this magnitude; sadly, the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has fallen short in this regard. The lack of openness and clear communication has eroded public confidence in the inquiry's ability to fulfill its objectives and deliver justice. The limited accessibility of information, repeated clashes with stakeholders, and inadequate explanation of decisions have all contributed to a profound sense of distrust among survivors and the wider public.

 

5. Damaged Reputations and Lost Opportunities:

 

The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry's mishandling of victims' testimonies and its overall treatment of survivors have damaged its own reputation and created an environment of mistrust. Many victims have withdrawn from the inquiry due to the distress and re-traumatisation they experienced during proceedings, which can only be seen as a failure on the part of those responsible for ensuring a safe and supportive environment for survivors. The lost opportunities for genuine healing and justice for victims are inexcusable and further reflect the inquiry's ineptitude.

 

Conclusion:

 

In its handling of victims and survivors, the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has demonstrated a shocking disregard for their welfare and pursuit of justice. The lack of appropriate support, delayed justice, limited scope, and evasive tactics all contribute to a deeply flawed process. It is imperative that swift action is taken to rectify these shortcomings, providing survivors with the respect, dignity, and support they deserve in their quest for justice and healing. Only then can the inquiry truly serve its purpose and deliver on its promises .

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We also discovered that during the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, Glasgow Social Work Department severely let down the survivors of historic abuse while they were in the care of the Scottish Government

Their record keeping and the deletion of records that proved the abuse, were  either deleted or destroyed. Same with their care home records. The staff at Larch-grove remand home names have been deleted. However ,if it wasn't for other survivors remembering the same names of staff then there would be no case to answer. This alone prevented myself from going civil with my case and the redress scheme is not fit  for purpose. In my opinion. been nothing less than disgusting.

 

This Inquiry has brought to light a dark chapter in Scotland's history, exposing the systematic abuse suffered by vulnerable children in various care institutions in Scotland

While children that were abused were reporting this abuse to their Social Worker. No investigation or protection was offered to the children. Instead, the reports were destroyed, deleted or hidden.

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Underbelly True Crime discovered this was to protect the abusers and said institutions from prosecution and to cut the workload in the Social Work Department - states one ex Glasgow Social Worker:

 

The first major failing of the Glasgow Social Work department revealed during the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry was its inadequate investigation into allegations of abuse. Overwhelming evidence has shown that numerous instances of abuse were reported to social workers by children, but action was either delayed or failed to materialize entirely. The department's inability to respond promptly and effectively exacerbated the suffering of vulnerable children, allowing abusers to continue their heinous actions with impunity.

Further exacerbating the problem, even when social workers acknowledged the abuse, the Glasgow Social Work department often prioritized preserving the reputation of the perpetrators or institutions over the safety and well being of the children. This systemic failure demonstrates a flawed approach that favored protecting abusers and their organizations rather than ensuring justice and safeguarding the victims.

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Another concerning aspect of Glasgow Social Work department's response to the inquiry has been its failure to adequately support survivors of abuse.

The testimonies provided by survivors during the inquiry have shed light on the lack of appropriate support and care they received following their traumatic experiences.

Survivors have highlighted the insensitivity and lack of empathy displayed by social workers. Many reported feeling dismissed, ignored, or re traumatized by the department's handling of their cases. This failure to provide necessary support to survivors, particularly when they were at their most vulnerable, not only perpetuated their pain and suffering but also undermined their trust in the system designed to protect them.

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The lack of accountability and transparency within the Glasgow Social Work Department (Pollok) is yet another area where significant failings have been uncovered. The inquiry has revealed alarming instances where crucial evidence was withheld or destroyed, hindering the pursuit of justice for survivors and the identification of those responsible for the abuse.

Additionally, the department's resistance to external scrutiny and a culture of secrecy has eroded public trust and confidence in its ability to tackle child abuse cases effectively. Without meaningful accountability and transparency, it becomes difficult to identify the root causes of the department's shortcomings and implement the necessary reforms to prevent such failures from reoccurring.

Addressing the failings of the Glasgow Social Work department and ensuring justice for survivors is the only way forward and it requires comprehensive reform from Glasgow Social Work Department to safeguard vulnerable children effectively. It is crucial to establish robust processes for the investigation and protection of children, ensuring social workers are equipped with the necessary resources and training to respond promptly and effectively to abuse allegations.

Moreover, survivors deserve a compassionate and supportive response from social workers, with trauma-informed practices at the forefront. Adequate funding and resources must be allocated to provide ongoing support services for survivors, fostering healing and recovery.

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Furthermore, establishing clear lines of accountability and promoting transparency within the department will help restore public trust in its ability to protect children from abuse. This necessitates independent oversight of inquiries and investigations, ensuring all actions taken are impartial and aim to deliver justice.

The failings of the Glasgow Social Work Department during the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry are deeply troubling and indicative of a significant disservice to vulnerable children and survivors of abuse. A new department with robust reforms, greater accountability, transparency, and improved support services for survivors is urgently needed to rectify this department's repeated failings and prevent such atrocities from occurring in the future. Only through these measures can we hope to provide justice and healing for survivors and eradicate the systemic failures that allowed the re-abusing of the abused to persist for far too long, with some survives suffering from re-abuse longer than the original abuse they received while in the care of the Scottish Government.

How can this be right?

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Then we have our current SNP government. Who may I say, "screamed" for this Inquiry to take place. They buy Motor homes, Christmas gifts, shop Amazon, just spend our countries money on what they want. While us survivors sit back and watch them enjoy themselves as much as the care home staff who carried out the abuse had done so many years ago.

A free for all, back then on children, modern day on other people's money.

That's our Government for you.

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What about the survivors?

The PR spin has now gone. Now it's a hindrance to them, well us survivors are a hindrance to them. A piece of shit on their shoes, as we have always been. Sad, but true.