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  The Problem with Mobile Phones  

 

Mobile  phones have become ubiquitous and basic communications tools—now used  not only for phone calls, but also for accessing the Internet, sending  text messages, and documenting the world.  Unfortunately, mobile phones were not designed for privacy and  security. Not only do they do a poor job of protecting your  communications, they also expose you to new kinds of surveillance  risks—especially location tracking.

 

Most mobile phones give the user  much less control than a personal desktop or laptop computer would; it's  harder to replace the operating system, harder to investigate malware  attacks, harder to remove or replace undesirable bundled software, and  harder to prevent parties like the mobile operator from monitoring how  you use the device. What's more, the device maker may declare your  device obsolete and stop providing you with software updates, including  security fixes; if this happens, you may not have anywhere else to turn  for these fixes.  Some of these problems can be addressed by using third-party privacy  software—but some of them can't. Here, we'll describe some of the ways  that phones can aid surveillance and undermine their users' privacy.  

 

1 Location Tracking  

 

The deepest privacy threat  from mobile phones—yet one that is often completely invisible—is the  way that they announce your whereabouts all day (and all night) long  through the signals they broadcast. There are at least four ways that an  individual phone's location can be tracked by others.  1. Mobile Signal Tracking — Towers  In all modern mobile networks, the operator can calculate where a  particular subscriber's phone is located whenever the phone is powered  on and registered with the network. The ability to do this results from  the way the mobile network is built, and is commonly called  triangulation. One way the operator can do this is to observe the signal strength  that different towers observe from a particular subscriber's mobile  phone, and then calculate where that phone must be located in order to  account for these observations. The accuracy with which the operator can  figure out a subscriber's location varies depending on many factors,  including the technology the operator uses and how many cell towers they  have in an area. Very often, it is accurate to about the level of a  city block, but in some systems it can be more accurate. There is no way to hide from this kind of tracking as long as your  mobile phone is powered on and transmitting signals to an operator's  network. Although normally only the mobile operator itself can perform  this kind of tracking, a government could force the operator to turn  over location data  about a user (in real-time or as a matter of historical record).

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In  2010, a German privacy advocate named Malte Spitz used privacy laws to  get his mobile operator to turn over the records that it had about his  records; he chose to publish them as an educational resource so that  other people could understand how mobile operators can monitor users  this way. (You can visit here  to see what the operator knew about him.) The possibility of government  access to this sort of data is not theoretical: it is already being  widely used by law enforcement agencies in countries like the United  States. Another related kind of government request is called a tower dump; in  this case, a government asks a mobile operator for a list of all of the mobile devices that  were present in a certain area at a certain time. This could be used to  investigate a crime, or to find out who was present at a particular  protest. (Reportedly, the Ukrainian government used a tower dump for  this purpose in 2014, to make a list of all of the people whose mobile  phones were present at an anti-government protest.) Carriers also exchange data with one another about the location from  which a device is currently connecting. This data is frequently somewhat  less precise than tracking data that aggregates multiple towers'  observations, but it can still be used as the basis for services that  track an individual device—including commercial services that query  these records to find where an individual phone is currently connecting  to the mobile network, and make the results available to governmental or  private customers. (The Washington Post reported  on how readily available this tracking information has become.) Unlike  the previous tracking methods, this tracking does not involve forcing  carriers to turn over user data; instead, this technique uses location  data that has been made available on a commercial basis.  

 

2. Mobile Signal Tracking 

 

Cell Site Simulator  A government or another technically sophisticated organization can  also collect location data directly, such as with a cell site simulator  (a portable fake cell phone tower that pretends to be a real one, in  order to “catch” particular users' mobile phones and detect their  physical presence and/or spy on their communications, also sometimes  called an IMSI Catcher or Stingray). IMSI refers to the International  Mobile Subscriber Identity number that identifies a particular  subscriber's SIM card, though an IMSI catcher may target a device using other properties of the device as well. The IMSI catcher needs to be taken to a particular location in order  to find or monitor devices at that location. Currently there is no  reliable defense against all IMSI catchers. (Some apps claim to detect  their presence, but this detection is imperfect.) On devices that permit  it, it could be helpful to disable 2G support (so that the device can  connect only to 3G and 4G networks) and to disable roaming if you don't  expect to be traveling outside of your home carrier's service area.  These measures can protect against certain kinds of IMSI catchers.  

 

3. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Tracking

 

 Modern smartphones have other radio transmitters in addition to the  mobile network interface. They usually also have Wi-Fi and Bluetooth  support. These signals are transmitted with less power than a mobile  signal and can normally be received only within a short range (such as  within the same room or the same building), although sometimes using a  sophisticated antenna allows these signals to be detected from  unexpectedly long distances; in a 2007 demonstration, an expert in  Venezuela received a Wi-Fi signal at a distance of 382 km or 237 mi,  under rural conditions with little radio interference. Both of these  kinds of wireless signals include a unique serial number for the device,  called a MAC address, which can be seen by anybody who can receive the  signal. The device manufacturer chooses this address at the time the  device is created and it cannot be changed using the software that comes  with current smartphones. Unfortunately, the MAC address can be observed in wireless signals  even if a device is not actively connected to a particular wireless  network, or even if it is not actively transmitting data. Whenever Wi-Fi  is turned on on a typical smartphone, the smartphone will transmit  occasional signals that include the MAC address and thus let others  nearby recognize that that particular device is present. This has been  used for commercial tracking applications, for example to let  shopkeepers determine statistics about how often particular customers  visit and how long they spend in the shop. As of 2014, smartphone  manufacturers have started to recognize that this kind of tracking is  problematic, but it may not be fixed in every device for years—if ever. In comparison to GSM monitoring, these forms of tracking are not  necessarily as useful for government surveillance. This is because they  work best at short distances and require prior knowledge or observation  to determine what MAC address is built into a particular person's  device. However, these forms of tracking can be a highly accurate way to  tell when a person enters and leaves a building. Turning off Wi-Fi and  Bluetooth on a smartphone can prevent this type of tracking, although  this can be inconvenient for users who want to use these technologies  frequently. Wi-Fi network operators can also see the MAC address of every device  that joins their network, which means that they can recognize particular  devices over time, and tell whether you are the same person who joined  the network in the past (even if you don't type your name or e-mail  address anywhere or sign in to any services). On a few devices, it is physically possible to change the MAC address  so that other people can't recognize your Wi-Fi device as easily over  time; on these devices, with the right software and configuration, it  would be possible to choose a new and different MAC address every day,  for example. On smartphones, this commonly requires special software  such as a MAC address-changing app. Currently, this option is not  available for the majority of smartphone models.  

 

4. Location

 

Information Leaks From Apps and Web Browsing  Modern smartphones provide ways for the phone to determine its own  location, often using GPS and sometimes using other services provided by  location companies (which usually ask the company to guess the phone's  location based on a list of cell phone towers and/or Wi-Fi networks that  the phone can see from where it is). Apps can ask the phone for this  location information and use it to provide services that are based on  location, such as maps that show you your position on the map.

 

Some of these apps will then transmit your location over the network  to a service provider, which, in turn, provides a way for other people  to track you. (The app developers might not have been motivated by the  desire to track users, but they might still end up with the ability to  do that, and they might end up revealing location information about  their users to governments or hackers.) Some smartphones will give you  some kind of control over whether apps can find out your physical  location; a good privacy practice is to try to restrict which apps can  see this information, and at a minimum to make sure that your location  is only shared with apps that you trust and that have a good reason to  know where you are. In each case, location tracking is not only about finding where  someone is right now, like in an exciting movie chase scene where agents  are pursuing someone through the streets. It can also be about  answering questions about people's historical activities and also about  their beliefs, participation in events, and personal relationships. For  example, location tracking could be used to try to find out whether  certain people are in a romantic relationship, to find out who attended a  particular meeting or who was at a particular protest, or to try and  identify a journalist's confidential source. The Washington Post reported in December 2013 on NSA  location-tracking tools that collect massive amounts of information “on  the whereabouts of cellphones around the world,” mainly by tapping phone  companies' infrastructure to observe which towers particular phones  connect to when.

 

A tool called CO-TRAVELER uses this data to find  relationships between different people's movements (to figure out which  people's devices seem to be traveling together, as well as whether one  person appears to be following another).  Turning Phones off   There's a widespread concern that phones can be used to monitor  people even when not actively being used to make a call. As a result,  people having a sensitive conversation are sometimes told to turn their  phones off entirely, or even to remove the batteries from their phones. The recommendation to remove the battery seems to be focused mainly on the existence of malware  that makes the phone appear to turn off upon request (finally showing  only a blank screen), while really remaining powered on and able to  monitor conversations or invisibly place or receive a call. Thus, users  could be tricked into thinking they had successfully turned off their  phones when they actually hadn't. Such malware does exist, at least for  some devices, though we have little information about how well it works  or how widely it has been used. Turning phones off has its own potential disadvantage: if many people  at one location all do it at the same time, it's a sign to the mobile  carriers that they all thought something merited turning their phones  off. (That “something” might be the start of a film in a movie theater,  or the departure of a plane at an airport, but it might also be a  sensitive meeting or conversation.) An alternative that might give less  information away is to leave everybody's phone in another room where the  phones' microphones wouldn't be able to overhear the conversations.  

 

Burner Phones

 

  Phones that are used temporarily and then discarded are often  referred to as burner phones or burners. People who are trying to avoid  government surveillance sometimes try to change phones (and phone  numbers) frequently to make it more difficult to recognize their  communications. They will need to use prepaid phones (not associated  with a personal credit card or bank account) and ensure that the phones  and SIM cards were not registered with their identity; in some countries  these steps are straightforward, while in others there may be legal or  practical obstacles to obtaining anonymous mobile phone service. There are a number of limitations to this technique. First, merely swapping SIM cards or moving a SIM card  from one device to another offers minimal protection, because the  mobile network observes both the SIM card and device together. In other  words, the network operator knows the history of which SIM cards have  been used in which devices, and can track either individually or both  together. Second, governments have been developing mobile location  analysis techniques where location tracking can be used to generate  leads or hypotheses about whether multiple devices actually belong to  the same person. There are many ways this can be done. For example, an  analyst could check whether two devices tended to move together, or  whether, even if they were in use at different times, they tended to be  carried in the same physical locations.

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A further problem for the successful anonymous use of telephone  services is that people's calling patterns tend to be extremely  distinctive. For example, you might habitually call your family members  and your work colleagues. Even though each of these people receive calls  from a wide range of people, you're likely the only person in the world  who commonly calls both of them from the same number. So even if you  suddenly changed your number, if you then resumed the same patterns in  the calls you made or received, it would be straightforward to determine  which new number was yours. Remember that this inference isn't made  based only on the fact that you called one particular number, but rather  on the uniqueness of the combination of all the numbers that you  called. (Indeed, The Intercept reported  that a secret U.S. government system called PROTON does exactly this,  using phone records to recognize people who placed phone calls in a  “similar manner to a specific target” from new phone numbers.) An  additional example can be found in the Hemisphere FOIA document.  

The document describes the Hemisphere database (a massive database of  historical call records) and how the people who run it have a feature  that can link burner phones by following the similarity of their call  patterns. The document refers to burner phones as "dropped phones"  because their user will "drop" one and start using another one—but the  database analytics algorithms can draw the connection between one phone  and another when this happens, so long as both were used to make or  receive calls to similar sets of phone numbers. Together, these facts mean that effective use of burner phones to  hide from government surveillance requires, at a minimum: not reusing  either SIM cards or devices; not carrying different devices together;  not creating a physical association between the places where different  devices are used; and not calling or being called by the same people  when using different devices. (This isn't necessarily a complete list;  for example, we haven't considered the risk  of physical surveillance of the place where the phone was sold, or the  places where it's used, or the possibility of software to recognize a  particular person's voice as an automated method for determining who is  speaking through a particular phone.)  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry shortcomings are a danger to survivors

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Title: Unveiling the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry: A Barbaric Treatment of Victims.

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Underbelly True Crime

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The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, established in 2015, was intended to provide justice to survivors of historical abuse in various Scottish institutions. However, its treatment of victims throughout the process has been nothing short of shocking, endangering the pursuit of truth and justice. This scathing assessment aims to expose the failures and shortcomings of the inquiry, highlighting the continued mistreatment of survivors and the unjust practices that have marred its reputation.

 

1. Insufficient Support for Victims:

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The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has demonstrated a severe lack of empathy and consideration for the well being of survivors. Numerous victims have spoken out about the insufficient support provided, forcing them to relive their traumatic experiences without adequate emotional assistance or counseling. This neglect not only disregards their mental health but also undermines their ability to effectively present their experiences, damaging the prospects of a fair investigation.

 

2. Delayed Justice and Evasive

Tactics:

 

The inquiry's proceedings have been plagued by excessive delays, bureaucratic red tape, and evasive tactics, showcasing a disregard for survivors seeking justice. Time and time again, victims have been left waiting for their voice to be heard, only to be met with avoidable obstacles that hinder the progress of the inquiry. Such delays not only prolong the suffering of survivors but also allow perpetrators to escape accountability.

 

3. Limited Scope and Incomplete Investigation:

 

The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has faced criticism for its narrow focus, limiting the investigation to specific institutions and excluding others. By failing to broaden its scope and include all relevant organizations, the inquiry inadvertently perpetuates an incomplete understanding of the systemic failings that enabled child abuse to occur. This selective methodology risks shielding certain perpetrators, preventing a comprehensive and impartial examination of the issue.

 

4. Lack of Transparency and Public Confidence:

 

Transparency is crucial for an inquiry of this magnitude; sadly, the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has fallen short in this regard. The lack of openness and clear communication has eroded public confidence in the inquiry's ability to fulfill its objectives and deliver justice. The limited accessibility of information, repeated clashes with stakeholders, and inadequate explanation of decisions have all contributed to a profound sense of distrust among survivors and the wider public.

 

5. Damaged Reputations and Lost Opportunities:

 

The Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry's mishandling of victims' testimonies and its overall treatment of survivors have damaged its own reputation and created an environment of mistrust. Many victims have withdrawn from the inquiry due to the distress and re-traumatisation they experienced during proceedings, which can only be seen as a failure on the part of those responsible for ensuring a safe and supportive environment for survivors. The lost opportunities for genuine healing and justice for victims are inexcusable and further reflect the inquiry's ineptitude.

 

Conclusion:

 

In its handling of victims and survivors, the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry has demonstrated a shocking disregard for their welfare and pursuit of justice. The lack of appropriate support, delayed justice, limited scope, and evasive tactics all contribute to a deeply flawed process. It is imperative that swift action is taken to rectify these shortcomings, providing survivors with the respect, dignity, and support they deserve in their quest for justice and healing. Only then can the inquiry truly serve its purpose and deliver on its promises .

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We also discovered that during the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry, Glasgow Social Work Department severely let down the survivors of historic abuse while they were in the care of the Scottish Government

Their record keeping and the deletion of records that proved the abuse, were  either deleted or destroyed. Same with their care home records. The staff at Larch-grove remand home names have been deleted. However ,if it wasn't for other survivors remembering the same names of staff then there would be no case to answer. This alone prevented myself from going civil with my case and the redress scheme is not fit  for purpose. In my opinion. been nothing less than disgusting.

 

This Inquiry has brought to light a dark chapter in Scotland's history, exposing the systematic abuse suffered by vulnerable children in various care institutions in Scotland

While children that were abused were reporting this abuse to their Social Worker. No investigation or protection was offered to the children. Instead, the reports were destroyed, deleted or hidden.

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Underbelly True Crime discovered this was to protect the abusers and said institutions from prosecution and to cut the workload in the Social Work Department - states one ex Glasgow Social Worker:

 

The first major failing of the Glasgow Social Work department revealed during the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry was its inadequate investigation into allegations of abuse. Overwhelming evidence has shown that numerous instances of abuse were reported to social workers by children, but action was either delayed or failed to materialize entirely. The department's inability to respond promptly and effectively exacerbated the suffering of vulnerable children, allowing abusers to continue their heinous actions with impunity.

Further exacerbating the problem, even when social workers acknowledged the abuse, the Glasgow Social Work department often prioritized preserving the reputation of the perpetrators or institutions over the safety and well being of the children. This systemic failure demonstrates a flawed approach that favored protecting abusers and their organizations rather than ensuring justice and safeguarding the victims.

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Another concerning aspect of Glasgow Social Work department's response to the inquiry has been its failure to adequately support survivors of abuse.

The testimonies provided by survivors during the inquiry have shed light on the lack of appropriate support and care they received following their traumatic experiences.

Survivors have highlighted the insensitivity and lack of empathy displayed by social workers. Many reported feeling dismissed, ignored, or re traumatized by the department's handling of their cases. This failure to provide necessary support to survivors, particularly when they were at their most vulnerable, not only perpetuated their pain and suffering but also undermined their trust in the system designed to protect them.

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The lack of accountability and transparency within the Glasgow Social Work Department (Pollok) is yet another area where significant failings have been uncovered. The inquiry has revealed alarming instances where crucial evidence was withheld or destroyed, hindering the pursuit of justice for survivors and the identification of those responsible for the abuse.

Additionally, the department's resistance to external scrutiny and a culture of secrecy has eroded public trust and confidence in its ability to tackle child abuse cases effectively. Without meaningful accountability and transparency, it becomes difficult to identify the root causes of the department's shortcomings and implement the necessary reforms to prevent such failures from reoccurring.

Addressing the failings of the Glasgow Social Work department and ensuring justice for survivors is the only way forward and it requires comprehensive reform from Glasgow Social Work Department to safeguard vulnerable children effectively. It is crucial to establish robust processes for the investigation and protection of children, ensuring social workers are equipped with the necessary resources and training to respond promptly and effectively to abuse allegations.

Moreover, survivors deserve a compassionate and supportive response from social workers, with trauma-informed practices at the forefront. Adequate funding and resources must be allocated to provide ongoing support services for survivors, fostering healing and recovery.

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Furthermore, establishing clear lines of accountability and promoting transparency within the department will help restore public trust in its ability to protect children from abuse. This necessitates independent oversight of inquiries and investigations, ensuring all actions taken are impartial and aim to deliver justice.

The failings of the Glasgow Social Work Department during the Scottish Child Abuse Inquiry are deeply troubling and indicative of a significant disservice to vulnerable children and survivors of abuse. A new department with robust reforms, greater accountability, transparency, and improved support services for survivors is urgently needed to rectify this department's repeated failings and prevent such atrocities from occurring in the future. Only through these measures can we hope to provide justice and healing for survivors and eradicate the systemic failures that allowed the re-abusing of the abused to persist for far too long, with some survives suffering from re-abuse longer than the original abuse they received while in the care of the Scottish Government.

How can this be right?

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Then we have our current SNP government. Who may I say, "screamed" for this Inquiry to take place. They buy Motor homes, Christmas gifts, shop Amazon, just spend our countries money on what they want. While us survivors sit back and watch them enjoy themselves as much as the care home staff who carried out the abuse had done so many years ago.

A free for all, back then on children, modern day on other people's money.

That's our Government for you.

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What about the survivors?

The PR spin has now gone. Now it's a hindrance to them, well us survivors are a hindrance to them. A piece of shit on their shoes, as we have always been. Sad, but true.